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The purpose of the study is to develop an effective incident investigation procedure that 
may be utilized by Company XYZ as a valuable tool to reduce and prevent losses from 
occurring.  In order to accomplish this, a review of pertinent literature was conducted 
along with first hand participation in incident investigations at a Minnesota 
manufacturing facility.  By reviewing the literature related to incident investigations and 
identifying shortcomings in the existing procedure, recommendations were provided to 
ensure the incident investigation procedure will be a valuable tool to reduce and prevent 
losses. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Statement of the Problem 
 
Introduction 
 The Location 
 
The location for this study was Company XYZ in Minnesota (at the request of 
the corporation, the company will remain anonymous).  Company XYZ is a heavy 
manufacturing facility with approximately 1600 employees that operates 24 hours a 
day, 7 days a week. 
Costs of Losses in Industry in the United States 
 In the United States in 2000, there were 5200 workplace fatalities.  This 
calculates to 3.8 deaths per 100,000 workers for the year 2000 alone.  Also in 2000, 3.9 
million American workers suffered disabling injuries.  Work injuries cost Americans 
$131.2 billion in 2000, a figure that exceeds the combined profits of the top 13 Fortune 
500 companies (National Safety Council, 2000).  In addition to the losses mentioned 
previously, tens of billions of dollars are also lost in destroyed equipment and material 
where no injury was involved (Ferry, 1988). 
Role of Incident Investigation 
 
Injuries that occur in the workplace have many negative effects on a company.  
Insurance costs increase, productivity may decrease and training costs increase as 
employees are moved into unfamiliar jobs as well as other potential drains on company 
resources.  To preserve both the human and financial assets of a company, it is vital to 
have tools in place that focus on reducing losses. 
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A common tool to guide the loss reduction efforts of a company is the 
accident/incident investigation.  Accident/incident investigations most often occur post-
loss.  The function of the investigation is to identify the root causes of accidents and 
determine what corrective action needs to occur to prevent future losses.  The root cause 
is defined by Ted Ferry, an author of several books on incident investigation, as, “The 
management system that allows the substandard practice to be committed or the 
substandard condition to exist.”  Incident investigations may also be performed in 
situations where loss has not occurred, but has the potential to occur.  Larry W. Sorrell, 
a CSP with significant experience in accident analysis, supports the investigation of all 
hazards, even concerns, to prevent an accident from happening or happening again 
(Sorrell, 1998).  Whether an investigation occurs post-lost or to prevent a loss, the goal 
remains the same: identify the root cause and determine corrective action.  
 In addition to identifying the root cause of a loss, accident/incident 
investigations also serve other purposes.  One purpose is to ensure that the injured 
employee receive the workers compensation benefits they are entitled to.  A poorly 
written investigation report may result in an injured employee’s claim being denied.  As 
well as protecting employees following an injury, the incident investigation process also 
functions to protect the company from false claims (Sorrell, 1998). 
Carter and Menckel (1990) expressed the importance of accident/incident 
investigation procedures by writing, “Most accident prevention efforts are based on 
knowledge gained from accidents and, consequently, it is important to learn as much as 
possible from each accident.”  By identifying the root causes of a loss producing event 
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and implementing corrective action, the potential for reoccurrence and associated losses 
is reduced.  This is the value of the accident/incident investigation process. 
Company XYZ has an investigation procedure in place, but it has a lot of room 
for improvement.  The general flow of an investigation begins with a loss producing 
event, either injury or damage to product/equipment.  The department manager will 
print off the generic form from their computer, and write the basic facts of the 
accident/incident.  Next, the investigation will have to be scheduled which requires a 
significant amount of communication to ensure that all members of the team are 
informed of the date and time the investigation will take place.  The location is always 
the same, the plant manager’s office.  When the team gathers for the meeting, the 
accident/incident is recounted and details provided by the employee, the department 
manager, witnesses, engineers (if necessary), and the department safety leader.  Others 
in attendance include the plant manager, members of Health Services, and members of 
the Environmental, Health, & Safety department.  If necessary, the team may go to the 
incident location.  Finally, corrective action is determined, the action is written down in 
the appropriate section on the printed form, and the meeting is adjourned. 
The inefficiencies of this process are many and include: near-misses are ignored, 
too much time is spent to communicate basic information to team members, the current 
form is inadequate to meet the needs of the investigation, lack of an accessible database 
of past accident/incidents with corrective actions to allow follow-up of current reports 
and to review past action, and the meeting location is inappropriate.  From this list of 
inefficiencies, it is clear that the process at Company XYZ needs to be revamped from 
the ground up to be a valuable tool to prevent the occurrence of loss. 
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When properly done, Company XYZ and its employees will realize the benefits 
of a thorough accident/incident investigation.  However, when these investigations are 
not efficiently performed, the result is a waste of time and effort for all parties involved. 
Statement of the Problem 
 The incident investigation procedure at Company XYZ in Minnesota is not an 
effective tool to address the need of the company to investigate loss producing events or 
conditions.  As a result, incidents were either not being investigated at all, or if they 
were, the investigation was incomplete.  By neglecting to investigate loss producing 
incidents, or even near-miss activity, an opportunity to prevent/reduce future losses is 
not realized. 
Purpose of the Study 
 The purpose of the study was to develop an effective incident investigation 
procedure that may be utilized by Company XYZ as a valuable tool to reduce and 
prevent losses from occurring. 
Goals of the Study 
1.0 Analyze the current incident investigation process in place at Company XYZ. 
2.0 Identify the elements of an effective incident investigation procedure. 
3.0 Develop a process to guide investigations at Company XYZ that ensures 
investigations are a useful loss prevention tool. 
Background and Significance 
Incident investigations have the potential to be a valuable tool when they are 
effectively used in industrial settings.  When properly used, they serve as an efficient 
means to identify the root problem that resulted in the incident as well as determine 
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effective corrective action.  Incident investigations function to continuously improve 
operations at a facility to reduce human losses, financial losses, and material losses. 
Conversely, they also have the potential to be exercises in frustration if they are 
improperly implemented and used.  The current system in place at Company XYZ has 
been identified as an area of improvement due to the determination that the 
accident/incident investigation procedure does not provide an effective, efficient means 
to track past accident/incidents, report new ones, and refer to past corrective action to 
determine the effectiveness of recommended corrective actions. 
Profits and losses at Company XYZ are provided in percentages at the request of 
the company.  In 2001, profits before interest and taxes were 5.6% of sales while 
workers compensation costs consumed 4.2% of profits.  By reducing workers 
compensation losses, these dollars will be added directly to profits, increasing the profit 
margin of Company XYZ. 
Limitations 
 This study was limited to the needs of a single manufacturing facility.  While the 
process fit in well with work practices at Company XYZ, the process may need further 
modification for use in other locations. 
Definition of Terms 
Accident – An undesired event that results in harm to people, damage to property or 
loss to process (Bird & Germain, 1985). 
Accident/incident – An undesired event that, under slightly different circumstances, 
could have resulted in harm to people, damage to property or loss to process (Bird & 
Germain, 1985). 
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Immediate Cause – The circumstances that immediately precede the accident.  
Immediate causes may be broken down into two categories, substandard practices and 
substandard conditions (Bird & Germain, 1985).   
Basic Cause/Root Cause – The management system that allows the substandard 
practice to be committed or the substandard condition to exist (Bird & Germain, 1985). 
Corrective Action – Activity that is conducted to prevent the existence of a 
substandard condition or prevent the substandard act from being committed. 
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Chapter 2 
Review of Literature 
Introduction 
 The purpose of the literature review is to provide an examination of the financial 
impact of loss to organizations across the United States, in the state of Minnesota, and 
at Company XYZ.  After that, two models of loss causation will be reviewed to gain a 
better understanding of the loss process.  Further, the literature review will define the 
incident investigation process and describe its value as an effective tool to prevent loss 
by interrupting the loss process.  Next, a discussion of root cause analysis and cause and 
effect diagramming is provided to review their relationship with incident investigations.  
Finally, a review of the incident investigation procedure that is currently utilized by 
company XYZ in Minnesota will be provided. 
Cost of Injuries 
 In the United States in 2000, there were 5200 workplace fatalities.  This 
calculates to 3.8 deaths per 100,000 workers for the year 2000 alone.  Also in 2000, 3.9 
million American workers suffered disabling injuries.  Work injuries cost Americans 
$131.2 billion in 2000, a figure that exceeds the combined profits of the top 13 Fortune 
500 companies (National Safety Council, 2000). 
In 1998, work injuries killed 84 Minnesota workers and approximately 164,000 
Minnesotans were hurt or became ill from job related causes.  Also in 1998, the total 
cost of workers compensation for Minnesota companies was estimated at 1 billion 
dollars (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2002).  Costs not included in the worker’s 
compensation figure are indirect costs such as delays in production, administrative costs 
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of hiring and training new workers, pain and suffering, and economic costs to injured 
workers and their families not covered by workers compensation (Minnesota Safety 
Council, 1999).  From 1994-1996, traumatic injuries and disorders accounted for 89.6% 
of the total days away from work with about half of these (46.1%) due to strains and 
sprains (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2002). 
Profits and losses at Company XYZ are provided in percentages at the request of 
the company.  In 2001, profits before interest and taxes were 5.6% of sales while 
worker’s compensation costs consumed 4.2% of profits.  By reducing worker’s 
compensation losses, these dollars will be added directly to profits, increasing the profit 
margin of Company XYZ. 
The drains on a company when an employee is injured may be significant, 
especially when considering the direct and indirect costs of the injury.  Direct costs of 
an injury include medical costs and worker’s compensation costs while indirect costs 
may be far in excess of the direct costs after considering the costs of replacement 
employees, extra training, legal costs, overtime, lost product, decreased productivity, 
and so on.  Companies have a financial interest in preventing injuries to their 
employees.  The employee also has an interest preventing his or her own injury.  
Temporary or permanent loss of abilities, disfigurement, and pain that are a result of an 
on the job injury are just a few of the burdens that the employee will have to bear, 
potentially for the balance of their life.  When actions are taken to reduce injuries, both 
the company and the employee enjoy the benefits of the effort.  The causes of loss in an 
organization can prove to be elusive if the source is not methodically investigated.  To 
 12
provide a model to guide investigation procedures, several loss causation models exist, 
two of which are detailed in the following section. 
Loss Causation Models 
 There are numerous accident and loss causation models in existence.  The two 
that will be detailed in this section will be H.W. Heinrich’s Domino Theory and the 
ILCI Loss Causation Model.  Loss causation models are used as models for safety and 
accident prevention theory.  Loss causation models provide a direction of focus for the 
individual interested in reducing injuries in an organization.  Heinrich’s principles date 
back to 1932 and encourage focusing on near misses instead of injury-related incidents 
to prevent significant losses from occurring (Fulwiler, 2002).  The International Loss 
Control Institute developed their own model in 1985, the ILCI Loss Causation model, to 
provide users a tool to control the vast majority of accidents and loss control problems 
(Bird & Germain, 1985).  The ILCI model encourages focusing on development of 
standards, the measurement and evaluation of standards to ensure they are being 
followed through by members of the organization, and the continuous update of 
standards to provide a means to prevent injuries in an organization.  A more detailed 
account of each of these loss causation models follows starting with Heinrich’s theory. 
 H.W. Heinrich’s Domino Theory of Loss Causation 
In his 1932 book “Industrial Accident Prevention”, H.W. Heinrich wrote that 
there are five factors in the accident sequence.  The first factor is the social environment 
and ancestry.  Traits such as recklessness, stubbornness, avariciousness, and other 
undesirable character traits may be passed along through inheritance.  The second factor 
is the fault of the person.  This factor states that inherited or acquired traits of the 
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person; such as violent temper, lack of consideration, ignorance of safe practice, etc., 
are responsible for the person committing unsafe acts or allowing the existence of 
mechanical or physical hazards.  The third factor is the unsafe act and/or mechanical or 
physical hazard.  Unsafe acts include standing under suspended loads, failure to adhere 
to lock-out/tag-out policy, horseplay, and removal of safeguards.  Mechanical or 
physical hazards include such items as unguarded machinery, unguarded pinch points, 
and insufficient light.  The fourth factor is the accident.  The accident includes events 
such as slips and trips, being struck by flying objects, being caught in machinery, or 
coming into contact with high energy sources.  Finally, the fifth and last factor is the 
injury.  Injuries include fractures, lacerations, etc., that result directly from accidents 
(Heinrich, 1932). 
 Heinrich then arranges these five factors in a domino fashion such that the fall of 
the first domino results in the fall of the entire row.  The domino arrangement illustrates 
Heinrich’s notion that each factor leads to the next with the end result being the injury.  
It also illustrates that if one of the factors (dominos) is removed, the sequence is unable 
to progress and the injury will not occur.  While it may be difficult or impossible to 
change a person’s attitude (the first and second domino), proper supervision can guide 
the person’s behavior so that they do not perform a substandard act or allow a 
substandard condition to exist (the third domino) which leads to an accident (the fourth 
domino) that leads to an injury (the fifth and final domino). 
 Heinrich also developed a pyramid shaped model to explain the relationship of 
near-miss accidents to minor injuries and major injuries.  Heinrich’s pyramid states that 
for every 300 near-miss incidents, there will be 29 minor injuries, and 1 major injury.  
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This pyramid summarizes Heinrich’s belief that-near miss incidents must be prevented 
in order to eliminate the possibility of reaching each successive level of the pyramid.  
Figure 1 depicts Heinrich’s pyramid. 
 
 
 
Near
 
 
 
 
 
F
 While the terminology and thinki
Accident Prevention are dated, the proce
employees and managers insures that the
with employees to reduce the occurrence
opportunity for more severe injuries to o
that it relies on a single cause that leads t
of a single cause; more likely, an inciden
simultaneously to produce the incident o
of loss causation is the ILCI Loss Causat
focused on reducing the incidence of nea
development of performance standards a
employees are performing their work in 1 Major
Injury 29 Minor
Injuries M s
i
ng
ss
 m
 o
cc
o
t 
r l
io
r 
nd
a 300 
iss Incidentgure 1 
 found in Heinrich’s Domino Theory of 
 remains worth review.  Properly training 
anagement system is working in concert 
f near misses that, in turn, reduces the 
ur.  A major flaw with Heinrich’s model is 
 an incident.  Rarely is an incident the product 
is the result of several factors that occurred 
oss.  A more up to date and complete model 
n Model that dates to 1985.  Where Heinrich 
misses, the ILCI model focuses on 
 enforcement of standards to ensure that 
safe manner.  With emphasis on performance 
 15
standards, the ILCI model takes a proactive approach to loss prevention and suggests 
that losses are due to a breakdown in these standards.  A closer look at the ILCI model 
follows. 
 ILCI Loss Causation Model 
 The International Loss Control Institute has developed the ILCI Loss Causation 
Model.  Like Heinrich’s Domino Theory, the ILCI model is based on a sequence of 
events that leads up to an eventual loss.  The events in sequential order are, Lack of 
Control, Basic Causes, Immediate Causes, Incident/Contact, and Loss (Bird & Germain, 
1985). 
 Each event has a role in continuing the loss process to its conclusion, the Loss.  
To facilitate a better understanding of the ILCI model, the events will be reviewed in 
reverse, starting from the end with the Loss (injury or damage to property) and working 
back to Lack of Control (inadequate program or inadequate compliance to standards).   
To begin, Loss is the result of an accident.  Loss can be direct or indirect, both 
of which must be considered to fully appreciate the impact to a company.  Direct loss 
includes some or all of the following; harm to people, damage to property, or a 
reduction/halt in productivity.  Indirect costs may include, but are not limited to, 
increased training costs to replace injured employees, legal expenses, investigation 
time, and loss of business due to unfavorable press.  The ILCI Loss Causation Model 
estimates that for every dollar of direct loss, the indirect costs may be six to fifty-three 
times as much.  Both direct and indirect costs of injury and illness are deducted directly 
out of profit; conversely, when dollars are saved from accidents the organization 
realizes increased profits (Bird & Germain, 1985). 
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 Prior to the Loss, the Incident occurs that may or may not result in injury to a 
person or damage to property.  A person or object is able to absorb a given amount of 
energy without harm, however, when the amount of energy exceeds the amount that 
may be safely absorbed, injury or damage results.  This not only applies to an objects 
kinetic energy that contacts the person or property, but also electrical energy, acoustic 
energy, thermal energy, radiant energy, and chemical energy (Bird & Germain, 1985).  
The American Standard Accident Classification code lists some of the more common 
types of energy transfers which include: 
• Struck against (running or bumping into) 
• Struck by (hit by moving object) 
• Fall to lower level (either the body falls or the object falls and hits the body) 
• Fall on same level (slip and fall, tip over) 
• Caught in (pinch and nip points) 
• Caught on (snagged, hung) 
• Caught between (crushed or amputated) 
• Contact with (electricity, heat cold, radiation, caustics, toxics, noise) 
• Overstress/overexertion/overload 
Continuing up the chain of the ILCI model, Immediate Causes precede the 
Incident.  Immediate Causes are subdivided further into substandard practices and 
substandard conditions.  While Heinrich used the term unsafe act or conditions to 
describe the direct cause of injuries, use of the term “unsafe” has fallen out of favor 
with current trends in accident prevention.  The term “unsafe” calls the organization’s 
ability to identify obvious problems into question, a potential problem in today’s 
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litigious society.  The term “substandard” acknowledges that organizations have 
standards of performance that are to be followed by all employees and is the accepted 
term used today.   
When substandard conditions and/or practices are allowed to occur in a facility, 
there is always the potential for an energy transfer that is beyond the persons/objects 
ability to absorb without damage.  To clarify substandard practices and substandard 
conditions, the following examples are provided: 
Examples of substandard practices would include: 
• Operating equipment without authority 
• Improper loading 
• Horseplay 
• Under influence of alcohol and/or other drugs 
Examples of substandard conditions would include: 
• Inadequate guards or barriers 
• Defective tools, equipment or materials 
• Poor housekeeping; disorderly workplace 
• Inadequate ventilation 
Prior to the Immediate Cause of the loss are the Basic Causes.  Basic Causes 
must be identified and addressed to allow a more effective control of losses.  The Basic 
Causes help to explain why people perform substandard acts or allow substandard 
conditions to exist.  The ILCI model divides the Basic Causes into two categories, 
personal factors and job factors.  Personal factors include lack of knowledge, skill, or 
inability to handle pressures of the job while job factors include such items as 
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inadequate training, inappropriate equipment and tools, worn equipment and tools, or 
inadequate equipment and tools (Bird & Germain, 1985). 
Lack of Control is the initial step that leads to Basic Causes and allows the 
sequence to proceed to the eventual loss.  According to the ILCI model, there are three 
common reasons for lack of control; inadequate safety/loss program, inadequate 
safety/loss program standards, and inadequate compliance with standards.  First, an 
inadequate program occurs when there are too few program activities to address the 
needs of an organization.  Necessary programs will vary depending on the size of the 
organization, work performed at the organization, and the methods to perform the work.  
Common elements of an effective program according to the ILCI model include 
management and employee training, personal protective equipment, engineering 
controls, planned inspections, task analysis, emergency preparedness, and incident 
investigations.  Second, inadequate program standards occur when organizations 
standards are not specific enough, not clear enough, or are not high enough.  Program 
standards need to let people know what is expected of them as well as provide them 
with a tool to measure their performance against the standard.  Third, inadequate 
compliance is a factor that leads to Lack of Control.  Most managers agree that 
inadequate compliance is probably the single greatest reason for loss.  Poor compliance 
with effective program standards is due to ineffective communication of standards to 
employees or a failure to enforce standards (Bird & Germain, 1985). 
In summary, the ILCI Loss Causation Model indicates that losses begin with a 
lack of control.  With a lack of control, basic causes such as lack of training or 
inadequate tools and equipment are allowed to occur/exist.  These basic causes lead to 
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the immediate causes, which are the existence of a substandard condition or the 
performance of a substandard practice.  Immediate causes lead to the incident itself, and 
conclude with the loss.  The loss may be to people, property, product, the environment, 
or the organization’s ability to provide its services.   
It is important to note that it is not the intent of the ILCI model to place blame 
on individuals for committing substandard acts or for allowing substandard conditions 
to exist, but rather to encourage managers to evaluate the management system that 
influences human behavior (Bird & Germain, 1985).  Richard Speir, a consultant with 
over two decades of safety experience, agrees that punishment should never be inflicted 
as the result of an accident investigation (Speir, 1998).  By punishing the employee, 
attention is shifted away from the management system that allowed the loss to occur in 
the first place.  The following questions may be asked to maintain focus on the 
management system to identify where the breakdown occurred that led to the loss: 
• Why did that substandard practice occur? 
• Why did that substandard condition exist? 
• What failure in our supervisory/management system permitted that practice 
or condition? 
The ILCI model starts with a lack of control.  Control is within the four essential 
functions of management, which are to plan, lead, control, and organize.  Taking this 
into consideration, it may be summarized that a loss is indicative of a failure on 
management’s part to perform one of its essential functions.  By asking the right 
questions, the lack of control in the management system may be identified and 
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addressed to prevent the sequence of events from occurring that leads to the eventual 
loss. 
Summary of Loss Causation Models 
As detailed in the ILCI model and H.W. Heinrich’s model, loss is very rarely the 
result of random occurrences.  Upon close examination, the steps that led to the loss 
may be identified and the cause of the loss defined.  This knowledge may then be used 
to examine similar areas of the organization for shortcomings to ensure that the loss 
does not continue to occur.  The process of examining past losses and applying the 
knowledge gained to prevent further losses is the heart of a process known as the 
incident investigation. 
Incident Investigation 
OSHA’s Take on Incident Investigation 
OSHA describes incident investigation as a procedure to determine how and 
why failures occur that result in personal injury or property damage.  OSHA further 
breaks down the direct cause of an incident, the indirect cause, and the basic (root) 
cause of an incident.  The direct cause is the energy or hazardous material that a person 
or object receives that cannot be absorbed safely.  The direct cause is usually the result 
of one or more unsafe acts, unsafe conditions, or both.  The indirect cause is the 
substandard acts and substandard conditions that allowed the direct cause to occur.  
Finally, an unsafe act or condition is usually traceable to a fault in the management 
system.  This fault in the management system is the root cause (OSHA, 2002).  The 
OSHA definitions of direct cause, indirect cause, and root cause follow the ILCI model 
quite closely.  Where OSHA identifies a root cause, ILCI identifies a lack of control; 
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where OSHA identifies an indirect cause, ILCI identifies immediate causes; and where 
OSHA identifies a direct cause, ILCI identifies an incident.   
While incident investigation is a tool frequently used in industry in an attempt to 
reduce losses, they are just one of the loss prevention tools used in an organization.  
Incident investigations are essential if management is to “profit” from errors that have 
resulted in loss (Ferry, 1988).   
Proactive and Reactive Incident Investigation 
At the most basic level, the function of an incident investigation is to determine 
the root cause of an incident and determine the necessary corrective action.  Gene 
Ernest warns of taking a reactive approach to incident investigations.  Too often, 
incident investigations focus on the direct cause of an incident and develop corrective 
action to address the direct cause.  For example, an employee operating an industrial 
truck runs into another truck causing damage to both.  Upon investigation, it is 
determined that the brakes on the truck the employee was operating failed.  The reactive 
corrective action would be to check the brakes in all trucks to ensure they are working 
properly.  The proactive approach to this problem would be to examine the management 
system that directs the operation and maintenance of all powered industrial trucks at the 
facility.  Questions asked by the proactive incident investigation team may be:  Are 
trucks being checked by maintenance regularly?  Is there a maintenance schedule for 
each truck?  Is there a process in place that requires the operator to perform a daily 
check and is the employee performing the check?  Is the operator properly trained to 
operate this particular truck?  To be proactive with incident investigations, the team 
needs to consider changing the management system to eliminate the direct cause of the 
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incident (Ernest, 1997).  By addressing the system rather than the direct cause, 
unforeseen errors in the management system may be corrected even before an incident 
occurs.  A proactive approach to incident investigation is built into the ILCI Loss 
Causation model by the fact that the first step of the ILCI loss sequence is Loss of 
Control.  The ILCI model recognizes that losses can nearly always be traced back to a 
lack of standards, inappropriate standards, or inadequate compliance to standards.  
Rather than ceasing investigation efforts at the Basic Causes (lack of knowledge, or 
equipment, for example), the ILCI model acknowledges that the management system 
must be evaluated to ensure the incident investigation is thorough. 
Incident Investigations for Near-Miss Events 
Professor Kenneth R. Andrews of the Harvard Graduate School of Business 
Administration is quoted as saying, “Every accident, no matter how minor, is a failure 
of the organization.”  This statement implies that accidents are a reflection of the 
management’s ability to manage and also that accident prevention is a management 
function (Ferry, 1988).  In Great Britain, the Health and Safety Commission is 
proposing to introduce a compulsory duty for companies to investigate all reportable 
work-related accidents, illnesses, or near misses that could have resulted in serious 
injury.  The Health and Safety Commission estimates that if every reportable incident 
not currently investigated by employers was investigated and acted upon, it would save 
up to 1.8 billion British pounds per year in preventable incidents (Kirby, 2001). 
Jerome E. Spear, a senior consultant for ECS Risk Control Inc., also supports 
performing incident investigations after a near miss.  Spear defines an incident as a 
deviation from an acceptable standard or work practice.  In Spear’s view, such 
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deviations indicate organizational problems and require investigation by the proactive 
organization to determine their root cause (Spear, 2002). 
Andrews acknowledges that management has the ability to manage accident 
prevention; the British Health & Safety Commission has recognized that employers’ 
actions will positively affect incident rates; and Spear agrees that losses are indicative 
of organizational problems.  H.W. Heinrich’s research indicated that 300 near-misses 
will result in 29 minor injuries.  It is clear that there is a far higher occurrence of near-
misses than loss producing events.  By investigating near-misses, breakdowns in the 
management system may be identified before a loss even occurs.  It is clear that near-
miss investigations are an essential component of a proactive management approach to 
incident and loss reduction and control. 
Incident Investigations vs. Root Cause Analysis 
A simple definition of root cause analysis is, “the most basic cause(s) that can 
reasonably be identified and that management has control to fix.”  After an employee 
falls and breaks an arm, one may determine that the root cause of the fall was gravity.  
However, management cannot affect gravity, thus an alternative root cause must be 
determined.  The very definition of root cause analysis allows for multiple causes.  
Traditional incident investigation has emphasized finding the one true root cause of an 
incident, but it is rare that an incident can be traced to a single cause (Paradies, 2000).  
In stark contrast to Heinrich’s model that attempts to locate the singe cause of loss, the 
ILCI Model of Loss Causation follows the principles of root cause analysis in that a 
lack of control can occur in more than one area. 
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When analyzing a problem, the investigator must understand what exactly 
happened before they can tell why it happened.  A tool to guide this understanding is 
the preliminary Events and Causal Factors chart (E&CF chart).  In an E&CF chart, the 
steps leading up to the problem are arranged and the reasons for each step are listed 
(Paradies, 2000). 
To use the forklift example again, the steps leading up to the collision of the two 
trucks may be: 1. Operator notices brakes operated differently at start of shift but did 
not report the change, 2. Operator notices truck takes longer to stop with full application 
of brakes and drives truck back to exchange it for a different one, 3. Brakes fail on truck 
and a collision occurs with a parked truck.  The reasons for step 1 may be lack of 
training, lack of familiarity with equipment, or brakes are inconsistent from truck to 
truck and the operator has come to expect variation.  The reasons for step 2 may include 
the operator is a distance from the alternate truck and wants to ride back rather than 
walk and/or production demands are such that the operator must work as quickly as 
possible and there is no time for walking back to get a different truck.  The reasons for 
step 3 may include a lack of maintenance on all trucks, lack of maintenance to this 
truck, failure to properly complete daily check of equipment or lack of process to guide 
daily checks of equipment.  Once these steps are charted, the investigation team will 
have a much easier time determining the true root cause that management has the ability 
to control.  The root cause analysis may reveal that there is not a daily checklist 
procedure in place and the employee has only been working with in the department for 
3 days and was not trained fully on the operation of the equipment.  In this case there 
are two root causes, the lack of a daily checklist procedure and lack of training.  Where 
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Heinrich would be trying to determine which of these two is the true root cause, the 
ILCI model acknowledges that any lack of controls need to be addressed to properly 
address the incident. 
Cause and Effect Diagramming 
 Oftentimes, it is helpful to diagram the causes of a loss using a tool known as a 
Cause-and-Effect Diagram.  Cause-and-Effect diagrams are best used early in the 
incident investigation process to organize ideas on possible causes (Spear, 2002).  
Cause-and-Effect diagrams are also knows as fishbone diagrams because of their 
resemblance to the bones of a fish.  The spine of the fish leads to the effect, in this case 
a loss.  Each bone of the fish refers to a different contributing factor category.  In this 
case, the contributing factors are divided into four categories: Materials, People, 
Machine, and Method.  Branching off of each category are potential causes that led to 
the end result.  The first step is to list as many potential causes as possible on the 
diagram.  Next, as facts are gathered, causes are either analyzed further or eliminated 
from consideration.  Finally, when a solid list of factors exists, the management system 
that is responsible for each factor is reviewed and corrective action determined to 
address the management error.  Both cause and effect diagrams and the ILCI model 
function similarly, that is, to determine the root cause(s) of an incident so that corrective 
action can be implemented to prevent the reoccurrence of the loss.  The forklift incident 
may be studied using a cause and effect diagram as shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2 
Incident Investigations at Company XYZ 
Incident investigations at Company XYZ are currently only held post-loss; near 
miss activities are not investigated.  Once a loss-producing event has occurred, the 
manager of the department that incurred the loss requests an electronic copy of the 
incident investigation form from the Safety Coordinator.  The manager must go through 
the Safety Coordinator since the form is not accessible to managers directly.  At this 
point, only the most basic facts are needed; who is involved, what happened, what 
injuries were sustained, the employees statement of what happened, and the date and 
time of the incident.  From here, the form is returned to the Safety Coordinator who 
forwards the form to the plant manager’s administrative assistant.  The plant manager’s 
assistant then schedules the investigation and notifies team members via Lotus Notes e-
mail.  The investigation team will include the affected employee or employees, the plant 
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manager, the department manager of the affected employee, members of the safety 
staff, members of the Health Services department, as well as any witnesses or other 
individuals with information that may be useful to understand how the loss occurred.  
The location of the meeting is always the same, the plant manager’s office.  When the 
team gathers for the meeting, the incident is recounted with details provided by the 
involved employee, the department manager, witnesses, engineers (if necessary), and 
the department safety leader.  During the investigation, the team may go to the incident 
location to gain a full appreciation of the events that led up to the loss.  One of the 
primary goals of the investigation is to determine what corrective action is needed to 
address issues discovered, and a section of the form is dedicated to corrective action 
that will be taken.  Once the incident is understood and corrective action is determined, 
the meeting is adjourned.  As far as record keeping of past incidents, the hard copy is 
the only record of past activity and is kept in the safety department’s files. 
Summary 
Incident investigation is performed post-loss and attempts to gather the facts of 
an incident, identify the root cause(s), and suggest corrective action to ensure the 
incident does not repeat itself.  To gather the facts of an incident, an investigation team 
is assembled.  Personnel involved on the investigation team usually include members of 
the safety staff, department supervisors, employees directly involved in the incident, 
and witnesses.  The investigation team may complete their task by taking photos, 
confiscating equipment, interviewing employees, reenacting the incident, and/or video 
recording the scene (Ferry, 1988).   
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Once the investigation is complete, the team determines what the root cause(s) 
of the incident was/were.  It is important to identify the true root cause(s) of an incident 
rather than fix blame on an individual.  Too often, investigators seem to focus on 
identifying an individual to blame rather than identifying the management system that 
allowed the loss to occur (Hoffman, 1998). 
Finally, corrective action is identified to address each root cause of the incident.  
Corrective action may include administrative controls, such as training and use of 
personal protective equipment, or engineering controls that centers on modifying the 
work area to eliminate exposure to the hazard.  It is important to not only identify what 
corrective action is needed, but to ensure that it has been implemented and continues to 
be utilized (Ferry, 1988). 
The function of the incident investigation is to identify the root cause, or fault in 
the management system, that allowed the incident or near miss to occur in the first 
place.  Root cause analysis defines the root cause as the most basic cause(s) that can 
reasonably be identified and that management has control to fix.  To assist in 
identifying the root cause, a diagramming tool such as a cause and effect diagram may 
be used.  Once the root cause is identified, corrective action is implemented to prevent 
the incident from repeating.  By investigating all incidents as well as near misses, 
several benefits will be realized. 
The first benefit of the incident investigation is that it provides the team with a 
tool to determine the true root cause and determine the needed corrective action.  Rather 
than blindly asking questions and haphazardly making recommendations, an effective 
incident investigation procedure provides guidance to ensure that the investigation is 
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properly conducted, the true root cause is identified, and effective corrective action is 
recommended and implemented. 
A second benefit of incident investigation is to provide a record of past incidents 
and their corrective actions.  Incident investigation records function as a resource to 
management for implementing effective changes in processes to reduce losses.  This is 
especially true in large organizations.  An easily accessible database of past action can 
serve as an efficient resource when new processes are added.  A second use of the 
record keeping is to monitor the corrective action that has yet to be implemented.  By 
recording what action will be taken and ensuring that it is completed closes the loop of 
that particular investigation and also ensures that the effort was not wasted. 
H.W. Heinrich recognized the value of keeping record of past injuries and 
dedicated a chapter to the practice in the 1959 edition of his book, “Industrial Accident 
Prevention.” Heinrich wrote, “When an accident and its resultant injury have occurred, 
the event becomes a matter of history.  If the work of investigation and record keeping 
has been done well, the facts of each past accident will already have been recorded in 
such manner that analysis covering a considerable period of wide exposure will require 
merely that facts already available be assembled and that conclusions be drawn.” 
For effective incident investigation record keeping, not only will the root cause 
of an incident be identified and corrective action recommended, but also an individual 
responsible for tracking the implementation of corrective action will be identified.  
Also, an effective incident investigation procedure will provide a record of effective 
practices to guide future action when changing processes, and serve as a check to ensure 
that past corrective actions are still being utilized. 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
 
Introduction 
 The purpose of this study was to evaluate the existing incident investigation 
procedure at Company XYZ, identify the inefficiencies of the procedure, and 
recommend solutions to make the incident investigation procedure a valuable tool for 
loss reduction and prevention.  The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the sequence of 
events and procedures used to conduct the study.  To accomplish the research 
objectives, the following method was followed. 
Method of Study 
The first goal of the study was to analyze the current incident investigation 
procedure in place at Company XYZ.  It is necessary to have a full understanding of the 
existing process before recommendations for change can be made.  To analyze the 
current incident investigation procedure, the author participated in five incident 
investigations at Company XYZ.  During each investigation, the author took note of the 
steps required to initiate the investigation, schedule the investigation, complete the 
incident report, and to file and review the report, as well as other important observations 
during the investigation.  The current procedure is only put into use following an injury 
or significant damage to property.  To initiate the procedure, the manager of the 
department that experienced the loss requests an investigation form from the Safety 
Coordinator.  The investigation team will include the involved employee(s) and their 
manager as well as the plant manager and members of the Environmental, Health, & 
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Safety department.  The team works to determine corrective action and documents their 
findings on the investigation form.  This form is then filed away in the Environmental, 
Health, & Safety department.  A closer examination of the investigation process is 
detailed in the following chapter. 
 The second goal of the study was to identify the elements of an effective 
incident investigation procedure.  To ensure that the recommendations to the existing 
process will truly result in a useful loss prevention/reduction tool, an understanding of 
those elements essential for a successful incident investigation procedure is required.  
This goal was accomplished through a review of pertinent literature related to loss 
causation and incident investigation.  In addition to basic incident information (who, 
where, when, what happened, etc), examples of effective process elements may include 
the investigation of near-miss activity as well as losses, an easily accessed form that 
managers may quickly fill out when reporting a near-miss or loss, and a record keeping 
system that allows quick review of past investigation results. 
The third goal of the study is to develop an incident investigation process that 
incorporates those elements of effective incident investigations and results in a valuable 
tool to reduce and prevent losses at Company XYZ.  To complete this goal, the 
inefficiencies of the existing procedure previously identified will be updated to 
incorporate the elements of effective incident investigations.  Further, a modified 
version of an existing database may be used to guide the incident investigation process.  
The existing database is a Lotus Notes-based database that is used to record the results 
of safety/housekeeping audits.  The way this database is used is as follows.  The 
Environmental, Health, & Safety department conducts quarterly safety/housekeeping 
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audits.  These audits are entered into the database and include the departments overall 
score and scores in various categories (Housekeeping, Hazardous Materials, Emergency 
Equipment, Tools & Equipment, & Personal Protective Equipment).   In addition, the 
database also provides a means to summarize corrective required and attachment of 
photos to document findings.  The use and capabilities of this database will be detailed 
in the next section as well as modifications required to create an incident investigation 
database that will serve to guide the incident investigation process at Company XYZ. 
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Chapter 4 
Results and Discussion 
Introduction 
 This chapter will detail the results of the study.  The topics discussed will begin 
with an analysis of the existing incident investigation at Company XYZ to provide 
background information on the procedure currently in place, then a discussion of 
elements of effective incident investigation procedures based on the results of the 
literature review will follow.  To close this chapter, a discussion of a process to guide 
incident investigations at Company XYZ will be detailed. 
Incident Investigations at Company XYZ 
 The first step of the study was to gain an understanding of the incident 
investigation process that is already in place at Company XYZ.  This was accomplished 
through the authors’ participation in five incident investigations.  To begin the incident 
investigation process at Company XYZ, a loss had to occur.  A loss that would trigger 
an incident investigation would involve either significant damage to equipment or an 
OSHA recordable injury to an employee.  The managers of individual departments have 
been instructed that incident investigations must follow losses and they must contact the 
Safety Coordinator of Company XYZ to notify them of the loss and to obtain the 
incident investigation form.  The Safety Coordinator sends the manager an electronic 
copy of the incident investigation form through the company’s Lotus Notes mail 
system.  The reason the Safety Coordinator must send the copy of the form to the 
manager is that the manager does not have access to the forms.  Once the manager 
receives the form, s/he fills it out with only the most basic of information.  Information 
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on the initial form will include items such as employee name, department number, date 
and time, and a statement by the employee of what happened.  After entering data into 
the electronic form or handwriting the information on a printed blank form, the form is 
returned to the Safety Coordinator.  The Safety Coordinator will then send the form to 
the plant manager’s administrative assistant who will schedule the investigation date 
after looking at each team member’s calendar via Lotus Notes.  Team members that are 
included in each investigation are the involved employee, the employee’s manager, the 
involved employee’s department safety leader, members of the Environmental, Health 
& Safety department, the plant manager, and members of Health Services.  Other 
people that may be involved include witnesses, engineers, or any other individual who 
may have information that may be used to determine the root cause(s) of the incident 
and determine appropriate corrective action.  The meeting location is always the same, 
the plant manager’s office.  On the day of the investigation, team members will 
converge in the plant manager’s office and a discussion of the events of the loss will 
occur as well as questions and answers from team members.  Each member will be 
provided with a copy of the incident investigation form with the preliminary details 
filled in.  If necessary, the team will relocate to the incident location to ensure that all 
team members have a thorough understanding of the loss and the loss is correctly 
documented on the investigation form.  During the five incident investigations the 
author participated in, the meeting always relocated out to the incident location to 
provide details of the loss.  The team discusses what corrective action is feasible to 
address the root cause(s) identified during the investigation and the department safety 
leader records the corrective actions recommended by the team on the incident 
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investigation form.  Once corrective action is determined, the meeting is adjourned.  
The Environmental, Health & Safety department retains a copy of the completed 
incident investigation form that is filed away by the Safety Coordinator.   
 Currently, there is no process to review the past investigations to ensure that the 
corrective action was actually implemented.  If a review is to be performed, it would 
require locating the hard copies of past investigations and reading through to find the 
corrective action, then going out to the department to observe if the actions are in place. 
Elements of Effective Incident Investigation Procedures 
 To identify the elements of an effective incident investigation procedure, 
information gathered during the literature review was utilized.  The basic elements of an 
incident investigation report are as follows: 
• Who was involved? 
• What injuries were sustained? 
• What property damage was sustained? 
• Date and Time of the incident 
• Location of the incident 
• Brief statement by the employee as to what happened 
• A cause analysis of the loss 
• Corrective action to address the root cause of the loss 
Bird & Germain’s book “Practical Loss Control Leadership” expands the list of 
basic components and recommends that the investigation report also include items such 
as cost of damaged property, the occupation and experience of the involved employee, 
and a checklist of immediate and basic causes (Bird & Germain, 1985).  While this 
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information will result in a complete form, there are other elements beyond simply 
completing a form that need to be incorporated for the procedure to be a valuable tool 
for loss prevention and reduction.  One element yet to be addressed is when to conduct 
incident investigations.  Traditional incident investigations are only conducted after a 
loss.  By limiting investigations to losses that have already taken place, many 
opportunities for improvement are being neglected. 
Several resources recommended conducting incident investigations for near-
miss activity as well as actual loss producing events.  The justification for this is to 
obtain as much data as possible to proactively investigate potential sources of loss.  Far 
more near misses occur than actual loss producing events and, as H.W. Heinrich’s 
research indicated, there is approximately a 10:1 ratio of near misses to loss producing 
events.  It is important to realize that both near misses and losses are equally indicative 
of breakdowns in the management system.  By investigating near misses, these 
breakdowns can be identified prior to a loss.  It is clear that near-miss investigation is an 
important element of an effective incident investigation procedure.  Once a process is in 
place to investigate all near-miss activity and loss producing events and reports are 
being efficiently completed, it is important to keep record of past activity. 
Record keeping is important enough to justify an entire chapter in the 4th edition 
of Heinrich’s book “Industrial Accident Prevention.”  By recording the details of an 
incident investigation and the resulting corrective action, a resource is created to guide 
future actions as well as a means to determine if recommended corrective actions have 
been completed.  To be a useful resource, past records must be easily accessible and 
updateable.  To provide an easily accessed and updateable database for incident 
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investigations at Company XYZ, an existing database was evaluated for potential 
modification to record incident investigation results. 
The existing database is based on a Lotus Notes document and was developed 
in-house at Company XYZ.  The database records the results of safety/housekeeping 
audits that the Environmental, Health & Safety department has conducted throughout 
the facility.  Not only are audit scores recorded in the database, but also the auditors’ 
comments and corrective actions recommended to address identified hazards in each 
department.  To ensure departments are accountable for completion of the corrective 
actions listed on the audit, the audited department must fill in a comment section for 
each corrective action after the corrective action is completed.  When an audit is 
initially entered by the audit team and has corrective actions listed, its status is “open” 
in the database.  Only after the department completes all corrective action and records 
this activity in the database does an audits status change to “closed.”  Finally, audits 
may be organized by status for review by members of the Environmental, Health & 
Safety department and reported on to ensure corrective actions are completed.  By 
combining an organized list of corrective actions required and the means for a 
department to indicate that fixes are complete, an effective tool exists for departments to 
efficiently address areas of concern as well as provide a tool for the Environmental, 
Health & Safety department to monitor the progress of improvement.   
A method to maintain confidentiality is built into the audit database as well.  
Each audit in the database has a section where department managers and team leaders 
names are entered by the audit team.  By logging into the Lotus Notes system, the 
database is able to compare your identity to those listed on the audit.  If your name is on 
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the audit, you are granted access to the form and may update the form after completing 
the required corrective actions listed on the audit.  The access to the database has two 
levels, administrative and individual.  Administrators include the EH&S department 
members, Health Services members, and the plant manager.  Administrators may access 
any audit and modify them as needed.  Individual access is limited to those people listed 
on individual audits.  If an individuals name is not on the audit, that person is not able to 
open the audit and confidentiality between departments is maintained.  A second feature 
of the database is notification of new activity.  When a new audit is entered, each person 
listed on the audit, including the administrators, will receive a memo with the message 
that new audit results have been posted.  Finally, the audit may have files attached to it, 
such as digital photos to record either positive or negative findings of the audit.  This 
system has been useful and, with some modification, would meet the needs of an 
incident investigation database as well. 
Modifications to the existing database would mainly be to reformat the 
electronic document to reflect incident investigation information rather than audit 
information.  A customized administrators list would also be necessary to ensure each 
team member has unrestricted access to the database.  The ability to list corrective 
actions required along with the status of each action would be maintained from the 
original database, as would the ability to attach files, such as digital photos, to the 
investigation document. 
A Process to Guide Incident Investigations at Company XYZ 
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 After reviewing the literature and observing the incident investigation process at 
Company XYZ, the following process has been developed to guide future incident 
investigations.   
 At the center of the incident investigation procedure is a modified version of the 
safety/housekeeping database.  By making the modifications described in the previous 
section, an incident investigation database would be created with the following 
characteristics: 
• A centralized location for all incident reports is created 
• Department managers would have instant access to the reporting form to 
initiate the investigation 
• Confidentiality is maintained 
• Corrective action performance may be efficiently tracked by both 
department managers and EH&S department members to ensure follow through 
of recommended action(s) 
• Notification capabilities allow team members to be aware of all incidents 
that are reported and streamlines scheduling 
• By including the plant managers assistant in the notification loop, 
scheduling may start as soon as the incident is entered into the database 
Further features of an improved incident investigation process would be the 
investigation of near misses as well as loss producing events and also relocate the 
investigations from the plant manager’s office to the incident location.  The flow of the 
incident investigations Company XYZ would be greatly improved by the flow of 
activity as depicted in Figure 3. 
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An incident or near-
miss occurs in a 
department 
Manager opens incident investigation 
database in Lotus Notes and creates 
new incident.   New incident is 
considered ‘open’ at this point 
Investigation team is 
notified of new 
activity vial Lotus 
Notes memo 
Plant managers 
assistant schedules 
investigation 
Team is notified of 
meeting date via Lotus 
Notes memo 
Investigation team 
meets at the incident 
location 
Department safety leader 
records information and 
corrective action determined 
during the investigation and 
completes preliminary form 
Completed corrective 
action is entered into 
the database 
Team members with 
administrative privileges may 
review all open incidents and 
develop a report of action(s) 
yet to be completed  
When all corrective 
action is completed, 
the incident is 
automatically closed 
Event is discussed; 
options considered, 
corrective action is 
determined 
 
 The collection of data reveals that although Company XYZ does have an 
incident investigation procedure in place, there are gaps that restrict its effectiveness in 
being a valuable loss prevention and reduction tool.  The suggested process depicted in 
figure three utilizing a Lotus Notes based database ensures that gaps that exist in near-
miss investigation, scheduling, recording, accountability, and review are filled. 
Figure 3 
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Chapter 5 
Summary, Conclusions & Recommendations 
Introduction 
 This purpose of this study was to evaluate the current incident investigation 
procedure in place at Company XYZ, determine what vital elements of effective 
incident investigations are missing, and recommend modifications to the process to 
ensure that the incident investigation process is a valuable loss prevention and reduction 
tool.   
Summary 
To summarize the study, a restatement of the problem will follow as well as a 
review of the methods and procedures used to complete the study. 
Restatement of the Problem 
The incident investigation procedure at Company XYZ in Minnesota is not an 
effective tool to address the need of the company to investigate loss producing events or 
conditions.  As a result, incidents were either not being investigated at all, or if they 
were, the investigation was incomplete.  By neglecting to investigate loss producing 
incidents, or even near-miss activity, an opportunity to prevent/reduce future losses is 
not realized.  The methods used in the study are detailed in the next paragraph.   
Methods and Procedures 
 The study was performed by first analyzing the current incident investigation 
procedure at Company XYZ through participation in five incident investigations.  Next 
incident investigation based literature was reviewed to identify essential elements that 
may be missing from Company XYZ’s procedure.  Finally, an improved incident 
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investigation procedure was developed that incorporates those essential elements 
identified in the literature review, addresses inefficiencies in the current system, and 
utilizes an existing database as a central element to guide investigation at Company 
XYZ. 
Major Findings 
Based on the analysis of the existing incident investigation procedure in place at 
Company XYZ, the following findings were significant: 
• For an incident investigation to be initiated, an actual loss to property 
or OSHA recordable incident has to occur. 
• Several steps that require a significant amount of paper shuffling 
must be completed before the investigation will be scheduled. 
• The investigation team for every investigation always consists of the 
plant manager, members of Health Services, and members of the EH&S 
department.  Additional team members will vary as different departments 
initiate investigations that require input from an assortment of people. 
• The meeting is concluded after corrective action is determined.  
Currently, there is no means to efficiently review past corrective actions 
to ensure they have been completed. 
• Although the investigation meetings are located in the plant 
manager’s office, the meeting always relocates to the incident location to 
provide team members with a clearer understanding of the event. 
• Record keeping is limited to the EH&S department Safety 
Coordinator filing a hard copy of the incident report away. 
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 Based on literature review, the following elements were determined to be 
essential for effective incident investigations: 
• Basic information for any incident report will include who was involved, 
what injuries were sustained, what property was damaged, date and time 
of the incident, location of the incident, a brief statement by the 
employee as to what happened, a cause analysis of the loss, and 
corrective action to address the root cause of the loss. 
• The root cause of an incident is the most basic cause of an accident that 
management has the ability to control.   
• Investigation of near-miss activity as well as loss producing events is 
mandatory to ensure that incident investigations take a proactive stance 
in preventing and reducing loss. 
• Records need to be maintained for efficient review of past incidents and 
to track the implementation of proposed corrective action. 
The following findings were determined to develop a process to guide incident 
investigations in the future at Company XYZ: 
• Near-miss activity needs to be investigated to ensure that Company XYZ 
is proactive in reducing and preventing loss. 
• By modifying an existing database in use at Company XYZ, an incident 
investigation database can be developed that will streamline reporting, 
scheduling, improve accountability, allow for confidentiality, create a centralized 
incident database, and allow for quick review of past corrective action and 
actions yet to be completed. 
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• Incident investigations should be held at the incident location for 
maximum ease in recounting the event. 
Conclusions 
 Based on these findings, the following conclusions can be made: 
• Near miss activity is being neglected in Company XYZ’s incident investigation 
procedure.  By neglecting to investigate near misses, Company XYZ is allowing 
management errors to produce loss before they will be addressed. 
• The current investigation procedure involved too many steps to get an 
investigation even scheduled.  By the time an incident occurs, the manager 
requests the incident form, receives the form, completes the report, returns the 
report to the Safety Coordinator, and the Safety Coordinator delivers the form to 
the plant manager’s assistant for scheduling, a significant lapse of time will have 
passed.  This is an inefficient process that is a detriment to the implementation of 
corrective action. 
• Holding investigation meetings in the plant manager’s office is inefficient.  Team 
members do not have a clear picture of how the incident occurred.  By relocating 
the incident investigations to the incident location, time can be better spent 
determining what corrective action will be required. 
• A database currently in use at Company XYZ can be modified to fit the needs of 
an incident investigation database and will streamline the process as well as 
provide a method of record keeping and review to improve accountability. 
Recommendations Related to This Study 
 The recommendations related to this study are as follows: 
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• The author of the existing safety/housekeeping database needs to be contacted to 
modify the safety/housekeeping database to create an incident investigation 
database with the characteristics described previously.  By modifying an existing 
database with useful features already built-in, the new database may be more 
quickly developed. 
• Managers need to be trained to complete incident investigation reports for near 
misses as well as loss producing events to take a proactive approach to loss 
reduction and prevention.  To ensure the new incident investigation process is 
well received and is used properly, training of all users is necessary. 
• A significant amount of training is going to be required to ensure the database 
system is effective.  Managers and team members will need to be trained to use 
the new database, the plant manager’s assistant will need to be trained to 
schedule the investigations a notification of new activity is received. 
• The meeting location needs to be changed from the plant manager’s office to the 
incident location to make the best use of investigation time. 
• Potentially, information from past incidents needs to be entered into the new 
database. 
• A regular review of open incident investigations needs to be worked into the 
schedule of the members of the EH&S department.  This review may be monthly 
or bi-weekly and will serve to ensure that corrective action is being implemented.  
In addition, a review of closed investigations will ensure that past corrective 
action continues to be utilized. 
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• Further, a standard for incident investigation entry needs to be developed.  The 
standard will detail what information is required for each field in the database 
and serve to ensure that incident investigations are properly reported.   
Recommendations for Further Study 
 Topics for further study may include: 
• Follow-through of departments to complete corrective action as a result of 
incident investigations.  It would be interesting to determine the completion rate 
of corrective action and what factors were responsible for high follow through 
and what factors were responsible for low follow through. 
• Affect of Incident Investigations on Incident Rate.  It would be interesting to 
study the incident rates of companies before and after implementing an incident 
investigation procedure.  Related to this study, it would be interesting to know 
the differences in the investigation procedure for companies that experienced a 
significant incident rate drop as compared to those that did not. 
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